NSD1386/2024 Giggle For Girls Pty Ltd & Anor v Roxanne Tickle

Federal Court of Australia 

Running commentary 

"The gender industry is not merely a medical scandal, a women’s rights issue, or a cultural phenomenon. It operates as a profit-driven machine, not an ideological or emotional struggle. Framing it as a medical issue, social contagion, or gender conflict oversimplifies the problem, ignoring how both sexes are ensnared in a sophisticated technological sales campaign. This campaign, backed by influential business interests, normalizes the commodification of reproductive biology, as seen in the rebranding of transsexualism into transgenderism, particularly among young people".

- Jennifer Bilek, Investigative Journalist covering Transgenderism Technology-Capitalism

10:15am AEST August 4, 2025

Proceedings begin. Giggle's legal team is led by Noel Hutley SC, and Tickle's team by Georgina Costello KC.   Several parties were granted intervener status in the case including the Sex Discrimination Commissioner Anna Cody, Equality Australia, and the Lesbian Action Group.

The appeal is being heard over four days by justice Melissa Perry, justice Geoffrey Kennett and justice Wendy Abraham in Sydney.

11am AEST August 4, 2025

Barrister for the applicant, Noel Hutley SC,  is arguing his case on internal theoretical contradictions contained in the concept of “gender identity” especially when applied in the real world. 

The issue appears to be the problem of a person’s appearance being at variance to his or her claimed “gender identity” 

The presiding judge appears adversarial. 

Adjournment at 11:45am August 4, 2025

Reconvened at 2pm AEST. 

Sall Grover’s Barrister continues with his highly technical arguments.  These arguments would appear to be above the comprehension of an ‘ordinary reasonable person’.  

The barrister is presenting arguments on lexical & conceptual semantics in relation to the words & concepts in the Sex Discrimination Act. 

Debate is going on about the meaning of the word likely!

 To the ordinary person, it would be like scholastic theologians in the Middle Ages arguing about how many angels can fit on the head of a pin. 

The young woman presiding judge opposes the ‘construction’ put on the meaning of the word ‘likely’ by the barrister. 

 His meaning is akin to ‘balance of probabilities’.  

She, the judge, is becoming disagreeable & combative & the barrister appears to become frustrated by her constant interruptions taking up his valuable time in presenting his submission. 

2:30pm AEST August 4, 2025

More robust debate between the presiding judge and the barrister on the meaning of the word ‘sex’.  

The issue seems to be the change in the adjective ‘opposite’ to ‘different’ when applied to ‘sex’ in different legislation.  

 The issue of course is whether ‘sex’ under the law is intended to suggest ‘sex’ is binary or whether there are multiple genders 

3pm AEST August 4, 2025

Now the presiding judge is debating with the Sall Grover’s barrister the meaning of the word ‘woman’.    You wouldn’t read about it! 

The barrister argues that the Macquarie Dictionary defines "woman" as a female human being, distinguished from a man, and an adult female person, distinguished from a girl. It also includes the definition of "female" as relating to the sex that produces ova. 

The presiding member is showing signs of being biased in favor of a different definition of ‘woman’ that includes men who have had a ‘sex change’ 

4pm  AEST August 4, 2025

 Applicant’s barrister completes his long submission.  Presiding judge tries to sum up.

Then barrister for the respondent “Roxanne Tickle” comes on strongly to assert her client is a real woman. 

“We say” she asserts, “for the purposes of the Sex Discrimination Act Ms Tickle is a woman” 

She reiterates the arguments put forward by the original Federal Court decision.  Nothing new here. 

The meaning of the word ‘reasonable’ was speculated upon by the respondent’s barrister. 

Again, the legal argumentation is all semantics, 

4:15pm AEST August 4, 2025 

Court adjourned until 10am tomorrow. 

— 

August 5, 2025 - Day 2

I’ve now listened to the first 2 hours of the livestream,  starting at 10am AEST. 

We see Mr Tickle’s lady barrister standing addressing the 3 judges on the panel.

 As far as I can tell, the presiding judge is an attractive cisgender woman, highly articulate & confident, with long blond hair, as observed yesterday when she kept interrupting Sall Grover’s barrister trying to present his submission.  

It’s not known whether she’s a real blond or a fake brunette. 

Seated on the bench immediately behind his barrister giving the address, we see Mr Tickle himself wearing the same brown jacket and shirt that he was wearing yesterday.  

He’s got his hair brushed back and is looking every bit a man.  

Seated on the same bench but separated by 2 individuals, we see the applicant herself, looking every bit an attractive woman, looking down and taking notes, with her long brown hair falling in front of her shoulders.

 I’m looking at a blown-up screenshot of this scene as I write.   A picture, it is said, is worth a thousand words.   However I understand it would be unlawful to publish this picture. 

This-morning the argumentation has been of a highly academic & technical nature.  It’s quite boring, slow-moving, not amenable to reporting in detail.   It would need a PhD law student to get the transcripts and summarize the technical legal arguments for the ordinary Australian cisgender person. 

12:30pm AEST August 5, 2025

Mr Tickle’s female barrister raised the bizarre issue of Sall Grover laughing in court.   This was going to be used as a reason for giving Mr Tickle aggravated damages.  

The laughter was offensive behavior “exacerbating the pain & hurt to Miss Tickle’s feelings”.    

The barrister then raised the issue of Sall Grover’s use of the wrong pronouns in over 100 media interviews.

This was an argument for more aggravated damages to be paid to Mr Tickle for his pain and suffering about being deliberately “misgendered” after he had identified himself as a woman, dressed like a woman, had claimed unspecified surgery, and had his birth-certificate changed proving he was a biological woman.  

This presentation illustrates how gender madness has now become mainstream.   The barrister’s queer-theory academic bullshit is expected to be taken seriously by the presiding judge. 

Mr Tickle’s barrister comes on strongly to make the case that “gender identity” as per the law, is non negotiable.    In other words, because “gender identity” (like “same-sex marriage”) is accepted in law, it becomes reality and must be accepted by all law abiding Australians. 

Then she quotes tweets and public comments made by Sall Grover to suggest the applicant has broken the law by not accepting Mr Tickle as a real woman. 

12:50pm AEST August 5, 2025 - Court adjourned for recess, until 2pm 

2:00pm AEST August 5, 2025

Sall Grover’s masculine & forcible barrister takes the floor. 

“We are in disagreement on the issue of construction”

He’s talking about the concept of equality in relation to the purpose of the Giggle for Girls social media app.   

It is very difficult to report on the barrister's presentation to the court due to its complexity.  Readers would close their eyes due to boredom, and yawn. 

Here's an example of a 6-minute excerpt (in italics) of the words by Sall Grover's barrister, starting from 

2:30pm AEST August 5, 2025 

If you can follow his thinking then you're doing better than this citizen journalist.

The fact that she'd had communications with her of the variety taken, and apparently the discourses with that of the photograph, was concocted upon her to cross-examine. It was her malignant friend's obligation to give my witness, my client, (unclear)

Was there something more that Miss Costello needed to get from your client in order to put the submission she wanted to do? In my respectful submission, in the light of the evidence what's known, she should have put to her client, at the time you looked at her photograph and determined it looked like a male, you had to mind that it was

You had to mind that she was, you had to mind or you realized that she was holding herself out as a woman. You were aware of all those facts. That's what should have been done. Because it's all very well to say, put together a few communications. My client looked at the document, looked at the photograph, and the only thing that she relied upon in determining it was the appearance. What's put against you is that it was all there in the direct, seeing what she said, and she had annexed her affidavit. That wasn't annexed. It was annexed to Ms. Tickle's affidavit, that is, the email. You had taken... And dealt with it, responded to it,

But Ms. Grovenor said, my only recollection was of some texts and a phone number, etc. She was not taken up and dealt with in cross-examination, in my respectful submission. His Honour had the advantage of seeing my witness. That's a different point. No, no, but why I'm saying it is, I'm coming to that.

What I'm saying is... That's all I want to understand is why. Your opponent had made a judgement that whatever she needed was already there in the evidence. Why would she need to? But that judgement's up... Why would she need to if the children cross his arm? Because the judgement is to put it together. To say that at the time you were excluding it, you had to mind

Yes. Merely to say, that's why I took your Honours to 68, 69 and 70. Of what? Of, behind, I do apologise your Honour, I keep getting, C15, at page 165. Your client's in denial. any of that correspondence, as I understand it, in her affidavit. So is it correct to say that Roland Brown takes account of notice that a party has in advance of the other side's case? I think so. And here we have affidavits exchanged in advance of the hearing. We have written submissions exchanged in advance of the hearing. But to merely say their case must be

At the time you excluded them, you were excluding them by reason of, that is, with to mind the following matters. Not, you may have received the following matter, at some point. For all one knows, she was merely brought up a photograph and totally forgotten, not dealt with, not adverted to for these other matters. This is a person who is dealing with hundreds of these things at a time. Potentially up to thousands of them. And this is the respondent's obligation on us to prove acted by reason of a characteristic that pertains generally to persons who have the same gender identity. It wasn't of her evidence that she didn't remember looking at Miss Tickle's photograph at this initial exclusion

And at that stage, the question is, again, to go back to the act, that she didn't. That is, what disadvantaged you,

---
 
The barrister for Mr Tickle then briefly takes the floor. 

"Mr Hutley has said nothing in response to indirect discrimination" 

She gave a very short statement relating to this issue.  I presume she's saying that the applicant's case was only about direct discrimination but failed to address the issue of indirect discrimination. 

3:15pm AEST August 5, 2025

Presiding judge: "Now we get to the submission of the Sex Discrimination Commissioner"

The female representative of the Sex Discrimination Commissioner then takes the floor.   Her address is all about their interpretion on the law, specifically in these sections of the Sex Discrimination Act. 

1. Section 5B.  11 propositions I would like to put forward. One must take a broad interpretation of "gender identity"

2. Sections 7D (1) and 7D (2) Definition of Woman

3. "I understand Section 7B is still in play"

This discussion of these sections of the Sex Discrimination Act talks about the object the Act. this being about (i) to bring about social change in attitudes and (ii) to prevent discrimination against people who do not identify as their birth sex etc etc etc.   We've heard it all before.  It's straight out of Judith Butler's Gender Trouble book. 

Her presentation style was quite dry and pedantic, without passion.  It came accross like a university lecturer teaching her students all about the Sex Discrimination Act in a course on queer legal theory.

4:30pm AEST August 5, 2025

Proceedings adjoined until 10am AEST tomorrow.

11 am AEST August 6, 2025

1 hour after commencement of today's proceedings. 

A new barrister is speaking (see screenshot that cannot be published).

He's aged about 50, stocky build, brown hair brushed back.

Mr Tickle sitting behind him looking worried man.  He's wearing the same clothes as yesterday. All the seated silks and their assistants are looking glum and worried.  It's like they were witnessing a tense final in the world chess championships, desperate for their man to win.   

He's talking about 'construction' and quoting various abstruse case law citations.  

He's talking at length about the meaning of the word 'woman' in the Act. 

He refers to section 7 of the Act, and runs through the sub-paragraphs of this sections that talk about pregnant women, potentially pregnant women, breastfeeding women etc 

He is making a case that the word 'women' in the Act means 'biological women'. 

The presiding judge, possibly sensing that he as a strong case in support of the applicant Sall Grover, interjects: "What about women who can't fall pregnant?"   I guess that's a "gotcha" moment. In her mind, Mr Tickle would possibly come into that category of 'a women who can't fall pregnant'.  

Now the barrister's talking about a pregnant 'trans man' who needs protection under the Act when he 'gives birth'.  

So a man can get pregnant!

We are getting into the thick of gender madness now.    

He's now talking again about the issue of the word 'opposite', later changed to 'different' when referring to the word 'sex' in the Act.      

He raises he hypothetical case of an 'intersex' man who contracts ovarian cancer.   He refers to the problems this case brings up in the Act.  He's talking about 'intersex discrimination'.   He's arguing that an 'intersex man' has protection under the Act. 

"We have a dedicated Act for women due to the social position of women compared to men" 

Refers to UK legislation of April this year. 

(In April 2025, the UK Supreme Court ruled on the interpretation of "sex" within the Equality Act 2010, specifically in the case For Women Scotland v The Scottish Ministers. The court determined that "sex" in the Act should be understood as biological sex (male or female at birth), rather than "certificated sex" (as defined by a Gender Recognition Certificate). This decision clarifies that a Gender Recognition Certificate does not change a person's legal sex for the purposes of the Equality Act)

11:27am AEST August 6, 2025

Female barrister with a Scottish accent takes the floor.  She's aged about 50, long blond hair, arguing that sex is not binary. 

'Sex' should be interpreted liberally.  She's arguing that 'sex at birth' is only one construction of 'sex'.  

"'Gender identity' is not related to 'sex at birth'"
  
"There are compelling reasons why a person's 'sex' must be determined 'at the time of discrimination'" and not at any other time. 

Goodness gracious!  Because a person's 'sex' is changeable, then it follows that one's 'sex' is a function of time.    Under this law, a person can have a defferent 'sex' at different times in their life, depending on their changeable feelings at the time.   

11:38am AEST August 6, 2035

Her address ended.

Sall Grover's barrister Noel Hutley SC now takes the floor.

He's speaking with his sombre and authoritative masculine voice.

What he's talking about is above this citizen journalist's head.   Therefore it is difficult to report.   It would be like a primary school student trying to report on a university lecture on quantum physics. 

To illustrate my point, I'll just copy below - verbatim - in italics what the good barrister said during a 3-minute interval from 

11:45am to 11:48am AEST on August 6, 2025.  

If you can understand you're doing well. 

3-minute excerpt.

. . . .requirements, which again my learned friend said was the use of proposers was indicative of her obstruction. And your Honours will see immediately that the bill in its then form was dealing with an effect upon the aggrieved person of a condition or a proposed condition. And that it's highly likely that that would have been an actual effect, obviously. Or one which was more likely than not to occur. Not just at real chance. Because it didn't have the difficulty, as it were, which Malone and friends suggested about proposed. You couldn't know it about a class it's likely to be put upon. Now, what happened is that that all changed. And the way it changed can be seen in this committee report at, if you're honest with me, pass on if you honestly would, that the section commencing at 394, I'm sorry, I'm taking, I'm taking one of them. If you're honest then pass over, I do apologize. To 397. And there was a criticism of the proposed new definition. And you're honest, see it at 1.38. It's important that the definition accurately reflect the intended objectives because there's no fallback position.  The new definition describes discrimination in terms of individual rather than group effects. The complainant needs to suffer disadvantage because of his or her disability, et cetera. The definition could be said to have the same outcome as the definition of direct discrimination in 5.1, except the measure must disadvantage a person rather than put them out to less painful treatment. And then there's submission by individuals, and Ms. Hunter came to observe, make that observation. And then there's a discussion of the proportionality test, and then various matters that went on. 

---

See screenshot (unpublished) at 12:05am AEST August 6, 2025.   Mr Tickle is seated behind Noel Hutley SC as he speaks.  The respondent is looking decidedly unhappy, pursing his lips and giving the impression that he doesn't have a clue what is going on. 

12:26pm AEST August 6, 2025

The presiding judge interjects and tries to shut down Noel Hutley SC 

Hutley manages to get some more time, after asking "How much longer can I have". 

He refers to section 33 in the Act.  Presiding judge immediately interjects and says "there is no section 33 in the Act" to which Hutley responds "I was referring to the original Act, not the present Act".   Touché.

The overall impression I get is that the presiding judge has been selected to represent the referring authority, namely the Australian Human Rights Commission.   This does not bode well for Sall Grover and might suggest that the case will end up in the High Court of Australia to get some resolution.    

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